In Medina, the Imams of Ahl ul-bayt disseminated their knowledge through gatherings with their followers, known as the Shi’a. During these sessions, the companions of the Imams either recorded or memorized the sayings and teachings of their teachers. These recorded sayings were later known as aḫbār – traditions or reports – and since many of them were isolated reports they were later recognized as aḫbār āḥād (plural for ḫabar al-wāhid). The legitimacy and authority of ḫabar al-wāhid has been disputed since the formative period of Shii jurisprudence, some arguing for while others arguing against. Several contemporary Shiʻi scholars have also called for the rejection of ḫabar al-wāhid, inviting jurists to form a Shiʻi Fiqh free of ḫabar al-wāhid. But how realistic is this idea? How practical is forming a complete system of Fiqh without incorporating the thousands of aḫbār āḥād? Contemporary jurists have suggested that other legal tools can replace ḫabar al-wāhid, such as the general laws of the Quran, numerous reports (tawātur), reason, and consensus. Will this not lead to the development of an entirely new system of Fiqh? This is what this paper will examine, which is part of an ongoing research on the role of ḫabar al-wāhid in Shiʻi jurisprudence.
